How to design incentive systems for the agents with multiple objectives

How to design incentive systems for the agents with multiple objectives

0.00 Avg rating0 Votes
Article ID: iaor20003334
Country: Japan
Volume: 44
Issue: 11
Start Page Number: 621
End Page Number: 626
Publication Date: Nov 1999
Journal: Communications of the Operations Research Society of Japan
Authors: , , ,
Keywords: decision theory
Abstract:

Agency theory has often been employed to discuss how to design incentive systems in organizations. Though in conventional agency models agents are assumed to devote their efforts only to objectives defined by the principal, in practice employees seem to have individual objectives different from the ones assigned by the management. Moreover, large conflicts exist between the objectives of a creative organization, such as the research and development department, as a whole and of its members as individuals. Based on these observations, a new model considering not only the defined objectives but also the employee's individual objectives is developed. It discusses how to provide incentives according to the monetary and non-monetary productivities of both the organization's and the individual objectives. The results of the analysis show that the principles on which the design of incentive systems is based vary according to whether a conflict between the organization's and individual objectives exists or not.

Reviews

Required fields are marked *. Your email address will not be published.