Cooperative games with stochastic payoffs

Cooperative games with stochastic payoffs

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Article ID: iaor20001674
Country: Netherlands
Volume: 113
Issue: 1
Start Page Number: 193
End Page Number: 205
Publication Date: Feb 1999
Journal: European Journal of Operational Research
Authors: , , ,
Abstract:

This paper introduces a new class of cooperative games arising from cooperative decision making problems in a stochastic environment. Various examples of decision making problems that fall within this new class of games are provided. For a class of games with stochastic payoffs where the preferences are of a specific type, a balancedness concept is introduced. A variant of Farkas' lemma is used to prove that the core of a game within this class is non-empty if and only if the game is balanced. Further other types of preferences are discussed. In particular, the effects the preferences have on the core of these games are considered.

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