Moral hazard in corporate investment and the disciplinary role of voluntary capital rationing

Moral hazard in corporate investment and the disciplinary role of voluntary capital rationing

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Article ID: iaor19982610
Country: United States
Volume: 43
Issue: 6
Start Page Number: 737
End Page Number: 750
Publication Date: Jun 1997
Journal: Management Science
Authors:
Keywords: financial
Abstract:

This paper compares three capital-budgeting rules, the NPV rule, a high hurdle rate and capital rationing, and explains why some firms may voluntarily impose capital rationing. Under both capital rationing and a high hurdle, a restrictive investment criterion is used to control managerial shirking. However, implementation of these budgeting rules requires a mechanism to prevent the firm from expanding the investment scale ex post. Capital rationing, in the form of a predetermined, fixed budget, differs from the high-hurdle-rate rule in that the former requires the firm to overcome the cost of raising additional capital before making further investment.

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