Article ID: | iaor19982356 |
Country: | Netherlands |
Volume: | 89 |
Issue: | 3 |
Start Page Number: | 570 |
End Page Number: | 580 |
Publication Date: | Mar 1996 |
Journal: | European Journal of Operational Research |
Authors: | Tijs Stef, Borm Peter, Potters Jos, Garcia-Jurado Ignacio |
A special class of normal form games is the subject of this paper. Typically, the player set of the games in this class consists of two parties and the games are aggregations of conflicts between two players, one in each party. Two 2-person normal form games, closely related to the original game, are introduced and relations between the sets of (perfect) equilibria of these games and the original game are derived. Using the fact that the structure of the set of (perfect) equilibria of bimatrix games is known, the structure of the set of (perfect) equilibria of the original games is revealed. Two characteristic examples are treated in more detail.