Collective behavior in the Stackelberg model under incomplete information

Collective behavior in the Stackelberg model under incomplete information

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Article ID: iaor20174348
Volume: 78
Issue: 9
Start Page Number: 1619
End Page Number: 1630
Publication Date: Sep 2017
Journal: Automation and Remote Control
Authors: ,
Keywords: simulation, economics
Abstract:

We present the Stackelberg model with linear demand and cost functions for the agents where the leader agent and follower agents have imprecise initial information regarding the marginal costs of competitors. Agents dynamically refine their perceptions and actions based on observing the actions other agents. We obtain necessary and sufficient conditions of the event that the dynamic converges to a Stackelberg equilibrium with true values of marginal costs. We also clarify the situations when agents cannot come to an equilibrium.

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