| Article ID: | iaor20171018 |
| Volume: | 64 |
| Issue: | 1 |
| Start Page Number: | 29 |
| End Page Number: | 40 |
| Publication Date: | Feb 2017 |
| Journal: | Naval Research Logistics (NRL) |
| Authors: | Kress Moshe, Szechtman Roberto, Atkinson Michael P |
| Keywords: | simulation, optimization |
We analyze an interdiction scenario where an interceptor attempts to catch an intruder as the intruder moves through the area of interest. A motivating example is the detection and interdiction of drug smuggling vessels in the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean. We study two models in this article. The first considers a nonstrategic target that moves through the area without taking evasive action to avoid the interdictor. We determine the optimal location the interceptor should position itself to best respond when a target arrives. The second model analyzes the strategic interaction between the interceptor and intruder using a Blotto approach. The intruder chooses a route to travel on and the interceptor chooses a route to patrol. We model the interaction as a two‐player game with a bilinear payoff function. We compute the optimal strategy for both players and examine several extensions.