Evolutionary games between authors and their editors

Here we examine the evolution of manuscript quality control between authors and their editors, using evolutionary games. Within these games, with a certain probability, authors prefer to submit manuscripts of low‐ or high‐quality, and editors prefer to accept low‐ or high‐quality manuscripts. The frequency with which authors (editors) choose to submit (accept) high‐quality or low‐quality manuscripts change over time in response to the decisions made by all authors and editors in the respective populations. Using this dynamical structure, we study which strategies become extinct and which survive, as well as whether the system approaches some stable end‐point. We also explore a number of case studies for editors’ and authors’ beliefs about that the submitted manuscripts must be of quality. When these beliefs are too weak, the stable end‐point of the evolution is a situation in which the scientific communication system will be so broken that it should be abandoned. By contrary, when editors’ beliefs are strong enough, scholarly communication will be reliable and will give the highest status to scientific research that is likely to be right and useful. In a third case study, when editors’ beliefs are not strong enough, the growing gap between the need for quality manuscripts and the quality of the material submitted threatens scientific communication. Computer simulations are used to mimic a real world system of authors and their editors.