Article ID: | iaor20163729 |
Volume: | 81 |
Issue: | 3 |
Start Page Number: | 427 |
End Page Number: | 447 |
Publication Date: | Sep 2016 |
Journal: | Theory and Decision |
Authors: | Chun Youngsub, Brink Ren, Funaki Yukihiko, Park Boram |
Keywords: | game theory, programming: convex, simulation |
A (point‐valued) solution for cooperative games with transferable utility, or simply TU‐games, assigns a payoff vector to every TU‐game. In this paper we discuss two classes of equal surplus sharing solutions. The first class consists of all convex combinations of the equal division solution (which allocates the worth of the ‘grand coalition’ consisting of all players equally over all players) and the center‐of‐gravity of the imputation‐set value (which first assigns every player its singleton worth and then allocates the remainder of the worth of the grand coalition,