An attrition game on a network ruled by Lanchester’s square law

An attrition game on a network ruled by Lanchester’s square law

0.00 Avg rating0 Votes
Article ID: iaor20161555
Volume: 67
Issue: 5
Start Page Number: 691
End Page Number: 707
Publication Date: May 2016
Journal: Journal of the Operational Research Society
Authors: ,
Keywords: programming: nonlinear
Abstract:

We consider two‐person zero‐sum attrition games in which an attacker and a defender are in combat with each other on a network. The attacker marches from a starting node to a destination node, hoping that the initial members survive the march. The defender deploys his forces on arcs in order to intercept the attacker. If the attacker encounters the defender on an arc, the attacker incurs casualties according to Lanchester’s square law. We consider two models: a one‐shot game in which the two players have no information about their opponents, and a two‐stage game in which both players have some information about their opponents. For both games, the payoff is defined as the number of survivors for the attacker. The attacker’s strategy is to choose a path, and the defender’s is to deploy the defending forces on arcs. We propose a numerical algorithm, in which nonlinear programming is embedded, to derive the equilibrium of the game.

Reviews

Required fields are marked *. Your email address will not be published.