Article ID: | iaor20161555 |
Volume: | 67 |
Issue: | 5 |
Start Page Number: | 691 |
End Page Number: | 707 |
Publication Date: | May 2016 |
Journal: | Journal of the Operational Research Society |
Authors: | Hohzaki Ryusuke, Higashio Takehiro |
Keywords: | programming: nonlinear |
We consider two‐person zero‐sum attrition games in which an attacker and a defender are in combat with each other on a network. The attacker marches from a starting node to a destination node, hoping that the initial members survive the march. The defender deploys his forces on arcs in order to intercept the attacker. If the attacker encounters the defender on an arc, the attacker incurs casualties according to Lanchester’s square law. We consider two models: a one‐shot game in which the two players have no information about their opponents, and a two‐stage game in which both players have some information about their opponents. For both games, the payoff is defined as the number of survivors for the attacker. The attacker’s strategy is to choose a path, and the defender’s is to deploy the defending forces on arcs. We propose a numerical algorithm, in which nonlinear programming is embedded, to derive the equilibrium of the game.