Normal Forms and Unfoldings of Singular Strategy Functions

Normal Forms and Unfoldings of Singular Strategy Functions

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Article ID: iaor201526265
Volume: 5
Issue: 2
Start Page Number: 180
End Page Number: 213
Publication Date: Jun 2015
Journal: Dynamic Games and Applications
Authors: ,
Keywords: strategy, singularity, strategic games
Abstract:

We study adaptive dynamics strategy functions by defining a form of equivalence that preserves key properties of these functions near singular points (such as whether or not a singularity is an evolutionary or a convergent stable strategy). Specifically, we compute and classify normal forms and low codimension universal unfoldings of these functions. These calculations lead to a classification of local pairwise invasibility plots that can be expected in systems with two parameters. This problem is complicated because the allowable coordinate changes at such points are restricted by the specific nature of strategy functions; hence the needed singularity theory is not the standard one. We also show how to use the singularity theory results to help study a specific adaptive game: a generalized hawk–dove game studied previously by Dieckmann and Metz.

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