This paper develops a coordination mechanism for a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and n Cournot competing retailers when the production cost and demands are simultaneously disrupted. This differs from traditional supply chain coordination models under a static case and the case with only demand or cost disruption. The coordination mechanism with revenue sharing is considered, and the effects of production cost and demand disruptions on revenue sharing contract are discussed to investigate the optimal strategies of players with disruptions. The penalty cost is introduced explicitly to obtain the production deviation cost caused by the disruptions. In this study, it is obtained that the coordination contract considering the production deviation cost differs from that without disruption. Besides that, the disruptions may affect the order quantities, wholesale prices as well as revenue sharing contract. Then, the optimal strategies for different disruption levels under the centralized decision‐making mode are proposed. Concerning the decentralized mode, the improved revenue sharing contract can be used to coordinate the decentralized decision‐making supply chain effectively. Finally, the theoretical results are illustrated by conducting some numerical examples.
