A Lower Bound of 1+f for Truthful Scheduling Mechanisms

A Lower Bound of 1+f for Truthful Scheduling Mechanisms

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Article ID: iaor20132088
Volume: 66
Issue: 1
Start Page Number: 211
End Page Number: 223
Publication Date: May 2013
Journal: Algorithmica
Authors: ,
Keywords: combinatorial optimization, game theory
Abstract:

We study the mechanism design version of the unrelated machines scheduling problem, which is at the core of Algorithmic Game Theory and was first proposed and studied in a seminal paper of Nisan and Ronen. We give an improved lower bound of 1+φ≈2.618 on the approximation ratio of deterministic truthful mechanisms for the makespan. The proof is based on a recursive preprocessing argument which yields a strictly increasing series of new lower bounds for each fixed number of machines n≥4.

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