A Cantor Set of Games with No Shift‐Homogeneous Equilibrium Selection

A Cantor Set of Games with No Shift‐Homogeneous Equilibrium Selection

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Article ID: iaor20135226
Volume: 38
Issue: 3
Start Page Number: 492
End Page Number: 503
Publication Date: Aug 2013
Journal: Mathematics of Operations Research
Authors:
Keywords: network equilibrium
Abstract:

We construct a continuum of games on a countable set of players that does not possess a measurable equilibrium selection that satisfies a natural homogeneity property. The explicit nature of the construction yields counterexamples to the existence of equilibria in models with overlapping generations and in games with a continuum of players.

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