Article ID: | iaor20133802 |
Volume: | 42 |
Issue: | 3 |
Start Page Number: | 673 |
End Page Number: | 694 |
Publication Date: | Aug 2013 |
Journal: | International Journal of Game Theory |
Authors: | Le Breton Michel, Moreno-Ternero Juan, Savvateev Alexei, Weber Shlomo |
Keywords: | project management |
This article studies a model of coalition formation for the joint production (and finance) of public projects, in which agents may belong to multiple coalitions. We show that, if projects are divisible, there always exists a stable (secession‐proof) structure, i.e., a structure in which no coalition would reject a proposed arrangement. When projects are indivisible, stable allocations may fail to exist and, for those cases, we resort to the