Stability and fairness in models with a multiple membership

Stability and fairness in models with a multiple membership

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Article ID: iaor20133802
Volume: 42
Issue: 3
Start Page Number: 673
End Page Number: 694
Publication Date: Aug 2013
Journal: International Journal of Game Theory
Authors: , , ,
Keywords: project management
Abstract:

This article studies a model of coalition formation for the joint production (and finance) of public projects, in which agents may belong to multiple coalitions. We show that, if projects are divisible, there always exists a stable (secession‐proof) structure, i.e., a structure in which no coalition would reject a proposed arrangement. When projects are indivisible, stable allocations may fail to exist and, for those cases, we resort to the least core in order to estimate the degree of instability. We also examine the compatibility of stability and fairness in metric environments with indivisible projects, where we also explore the performance of well‐known solutions, such as the Shapley value and the nucleolus.

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