Intensity of preference and related uncertainty in non‐compensatory aggregation rules

Non‐compensatory aggregation rules are applied in a variety of problems such as voting theory, multi‐criteria analysis, composite indicators, web ranking algorithms and so on. A major open problem is the fact that non‐compensability implies the analytical cost of loosing all available information about intensity of preference, i.e. if some variables are measured on interval or ratio scales, they have to be treated as measured on an ordinal scale. Here this problem has been tackled in its most general formulation, that is when mixed measurement scales (interval, ratio and ordinal) are used and both stochastic and fuzzy uncertainties are present. Objectives of this article are first to present a comprehensive review of useful solutions already proposed in the literature and second to advance the state of the art mainly in the theoretical guarantee that weights have the meaning of importance coefficients and they can be summarized in a voting matrix. This is a key result for using non‐compensatory Condorcet consistent rules. A proof on the probability of existence of ties in the voting matrix is also developed.