On the core: complement‐reduced game and max‐reduced game

On the core: complement‐reduced game and max‐reduced game

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Article ID: iaor20133020
Volume: 42
Issue: 2
Start Page Number: 339
End Page Number: 355
Publication Date: May 2013
Journal: International Journal of Game Theory
Authors:
Abstract:

This paper presents two characterizations of the core on the domain of all NTU games. One is based on consistency with respect to ‘complement‐reduced game’ and converse consistency with respect to ‘max‐reduced game’. The other is based on consistency with respect to ‘max‐reduced game’ and weak converse consistency with respect to ‘complement‐reduced game’. Besides, we introduce an alternative definition of individual rationality, we name conditional individual rationality, which is compatible with non‐emptiness. We discuss axiomatic characterizations involving conditional individual rationality for the core.

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