Coarse correlated equilibria in linear duopoly games

0.00 Avg rating—0 Votes

Article ID:	iaor20133015
Volume:	42
Issue:	2
Start Page Number:	541
End Page Number:	562
Publication Date:	May 2013
Journal:	International Journal of Game Theory
Authors:	Ray Indrajit, Gupta Sonali
Keywords:	duopoly, Nash equilibrium

Abstract:

For duopoly models, we analyse the concept of coarse correlated equilibrium using simple symmetric devices that the players choose to commit to in equilibrium. In a linear duopoly game, we prove that Nash‐centric devices, involving a sunspot structure, are simple symmetric coarse correlated equilibria. Any small unilateral perturbation from such a structure fails to be an equilibrium.

Reviews

Required fields are marked *. Your email address will not be published.