 
                                                                                | Article ID: | iaor20133009 | 
| Volume: | 42 | 
| Issue: | 2 | 
| Start Page Number: | 439 | 
| End Page Number: | 460 | 
| Publication Date: | May 2013 | 
| Journal: | International Journal of Game Theory | 
| Authors: | Bahel Eric, Trudeau Christian | 
| Keywords: | cooperative games | 
This article proposes a setting that allows for technological cooperation in the cost sharing model. Dealing with discrete demands, we study two properties: additivity and dummy. We show that these properties are insufficient to guarantee a unit‐flow representation similar to that of Wang (1999). To obtain a characterization of unit flows, we strengthen the dummy axiom and introduce a property that requires the cost share of every agent to be non‐decreasing in the incremental costs generated by their demand. Finally, a fairness requirement as to the compensation of technological cooperation is examined.