A discrete cost sharing model with technological cooperation

A discrete cost sharing model with technological cooperation

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Article ID: iaor20133009
Volume: 42
Issue: 2
Start Page Number: 439
End Page Number: 460
Publication Date: May 2013
Journal: International Journal of Game Theory
Authors: ,
Keywords: cooperative games
Abstract:

This article proposes a setting that allows for technological cooperation in the cost sharing model. Dealing with discrete demands, we study two properties: additivity and dummy. We show that these properties are insufficient to guarantee a unit‐flow representation similar to that of Wang (1999). To obtain a characterization of unit flows, we strengthen the dummy axiom and introduce a property that requires the cost share of every agent to be non‐decreasing in the incremental costs generated by their demand. Finally, a fairness requirement as to the compensation of technological cooperation is examined.

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