| Article ID: | iaor20133009 |
| Volume: | 42 |
| Issue: | 2 |
| Start Page Number: | 439 |
| End Page Number: | 460 |
| Publication Date: | May 2013 |
| Journal: | International Journal of Game Theory |
| Authors: | Bahel Eric, Trudeau Christian |
| Keywords: | cooperative games |
This article proposes a setting that allows for technological cooperation in the cost sharing model. Dealing with discrete demands, we study two properties: additivity and dummy. We show that these properties are insufficient to guarantee a unit‐flow representation similar to that of Wang (1999). To obtain a characterization of unit flows, we strengthen the dummy axiom and introduce a property that requires the cost share of every agent to be non‐decreasing in the incremental costs generated by their demand. Finally, a fairness requirement as to the compensation of technological cooperation is examined.