The core of games on ordered structures and graphs

The core of games on ordered structures and graphs

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Article ID: iaor20132695
Volume: 204
Issue: 1
Start Page Number: 33
End Page Number: 64
Publication Date: Apr 2013
Journal: Annals of Operations Research
Authors:
Keywords: cooperative games, literature survey
Abstract:

In cooperative games, the core is the most popular solution concept, and its properties are well known. In the classical setting of cooperative games, it is generally assumed that all coalitions can form, i.e., they are all feasible. In many situations, this assumption is too strong and one has to deal with some unfeasible coalitions. Defining a game on a subcollection of the power set of the set of players has many implications on the mathematical structure of the core, depending on the precise structure of the subcollection of feasible coalitions. Many authors have contributed to this topic, and we give a unified view of these different results.

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