CEO Turnover and Ownership Structure: Evidence From the U.S. Property–Liability Insurance Industry

CEO Turnover and Ownership Structure: Evidence From the U.S. Property–Liability Insurance Industry

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Article ID: iaor201112130
Volume: 78
Issue: 3
Start Page Number: 673
End Page Number: 701
Publication Date: Sep 2011
Journal: Journal of Risk and Insurance
Authors: ,
Keywords: insurance
Abstract:

This article examines the impact of ownership structure on the relation between firm performance and chief executive officer (CEO) turnover in the U.S. property–liability insurance industry. Theoretical implications of stock versus mutual ownership structures on the performance–turnover relation are ambiguous. Our empirical results indicate that CEO turnover is less responsive to firm underwriting performance in mutual insurers compared to stock insurers. In fact, we find that while CEO turnover for stock firms is negatively related to prior performance, no such relationship is found for mutual insurers. These results hold while controlling for board structure and other relevant factors.

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