On Nash–Cournot games with price caps

On Nash–Cournot games with price caps

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Article ID: iaor2013732
Volume: 41
Issue: 1
Start Page Number: 92
End Page Number: 97
Publication Date: Jan 2013
Journal: Operations Research Letters
Authors: ,
Keywords: complementarity, Nash theory and methods
Abstract:

In this paper, we study an N equ1‐person Nash–Cournot game with a price cap. Under certain mild conditions, we show that this game can be formulated as a complementarity problem. Based on this formulation, we study various properties of the game, including equilibrium existence, computability, and a description of the equilibrium set when there are multiple equilibria.

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