Article ID: | iaor201110093 |
Volume: | 48 |
Issue: | 1 |
Start Page Number: | 115 |
End Page Number: | 131 |
Publication Date: | Jan 2012 |
Journal: | Transportation Research Part E |
Authors: | Xu Ningxiong, Nozick Linda, Jones Dean, Reilly Allison |
Keywords: | supply & supply chains, game theory, transportation: rail |
Government agencies can determine which specific facilities in a transportation network to restrict for each class of material and for which times of the day and/or week to stem the consequences of a terrorist event. To guide in making these determinations, this paper develops a three‐player game of the interactions among a government agency, a carrier, and a terrorist. It also develops an effective solution procedure for this game and illustrates the use of that procedure on a realistic case study based on the freight rail network in the continental United States.