 
                                                                                | Article ID: | iaor201110093 | 
| Volume: | 48 | 
| Issue: | 1 | 
| Start Page Number: | 115 | 
| End Page Number: | 131 | 
| Publication Date: | Jan 2012 | 
| Journal: | Transportation Research Part E | 
| Authors: | Xu Ningxiong, Nozick Linda, Jones Dean, Reilly Allison | 
| Keywords: | supply & supply chains, game theory, transportation: rail | 
Government agencies can determine which specific facilities in a transportation network to restrict for each class of material and for which times of the day and/or week to stem the consequences of a terrorist event. To guide in making these determinations, this paper develops a three‐player game of the interactions among a government agency, a carrier, and a terrorist. It also develops an effective solution procedure for this game and illustrates the use of that procedure on a realistic case study based on the freight rail network in the continental United States.