A characterization of convex TU games by means of the Mas‐Colell bargaining set (à  la Shimomura)

A characterization of convex TU games by means of the Mas‐Colell bargaining set (à la Shimomura)

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Article ID: iaor20123811
Volume: 41
Issue: 2
Start Page Number: 381
End Page Number: 395
Publication Date: May 2012
Journal: International Journal of Game Theory
Authors: ,
Keywords: cooperative games, transferable utility
Abstract:

Within the class of zero‐monotonic games, we prove that a cooperative game with transferable utility is convex if and only if the core of the game coincides with the Mas‐Colell bargaining set (à la Shimomura, 1997).

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