Implementation without rationality assumptions

Implementation without rationality assumptions

0.00 Avg rating0 Votes
Article ID: iaor2012291
Volume: 72
Issue: 2
Start Page Number: 189
End Page Number: 203
Publication Date: Feb 2012
Journal: Theory and Decision
Authors:
Keywords: game theory
Abstract:

Hurwicz (Social Choice and public decision making. Essays in honor of Kenneth J. Arrow, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986) was the first to study an approach to implementation theory based on choice functions instead of preference relations. We argue that the solution concept used by him, the generalized Nash equilibrium, is not really compatible with the idea that individual behavior is describable by a choice function. A new solution concept that better fits the choice function framework is then introduced. Using this, we investigate what behavioral assumptions are needed for the full characterizations of Nash implementable social choice correspondences to still hold. We will show that a condition known as Property α is central.

Reviews

Required fields are marked *. Your email address will not be published.