A characterization of the maximin rule in the context of voting

A characterization of the maximin rule in the context of voting

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Article ID: iaor201111724
Volume: 72
Issue: 1
Start Page Number: 131
End Page Number: 147
Publication Date: Jan 2012
Journal: Theory and Decision
Authors: ,
Keywords: simulation: applications
Abstract:

In a voting context, when the preferences of voters are described by linear orderings over a finite set of alternatives, the Maximin rule orders the alternatives according to their minimal rank in the voters’ preferences. It is equivalent to the Fallback bargaining process described by Brams and Kilgour (2001). This article proposes a characterization of the Maximin rule as a social welfare function (SWF) based upon five conditions: Neutrality, Duplication, Unanimity, Top Invariance, and Weak Separability. In a similar way, we obtain a characterization for the Maximax SWF by using Bottom Invariance instead of Top Invariance. Then, these results are compared to the axiomatic characterizations of two famous scoring rules, the Plurality rule and the Antiplurality rule.

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