Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players

Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players

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Article ID: iaor2012472
Volume: 41
Issue: 1
Start Page Number: 131
End Page Number: 155
Publication Date: Feb 2012
Journal: International Journal of Game Theory
Authors: ,
Keywords: Nash equilibrium
Abstract:

Most work in game theory assumes that players are perfect reasoners and have common knowledge of all significant aspects of the game. In earlier work (Halpern and Rêgo, 2006, we proposed a framework for representing and analyzing games with possibly unaware players, and suggested a generalization of Nash equilibrium appropriate for games with unaware players that we called generalized Nash equilibrium. Here, we use this framework to analyze other solution concepts that have been considered in the game‐theory literature, with a focus on sequential equilibrium.

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