Power Index axiomatics in the problem of voting with quota

Power Index axiomatics in the problem of voting with quota

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Article ID: iaor20113670
Volume: 72
Issue: 3
Start Page Number: 600
End Page Number: 614
Publication Date: Mar 2011
Journal: Automation and Remote Control
Authors: ,
Keywords: voting systems
Abstract:

An axiomatics of power indices in voting with quota was proposed. It relies on the additivity and dictator axioms. Established was an important property that the player’s power index is representable as the sum of contributions of the coalitions in which it is a pivot member. The coalition contributions are independent of the players’ weights or the quota. The general theorem of power index representation and the theorem of representation for a power index of anonymous players were formulated and proved.

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