| Article ID: | iaor2012365 |
| Volume: | 34 |
| Issue: | 1 |
| Start Page Number: | 107 |
| End Page Number: | 132 |
| Publication Date: | Jan 2012 |
| Journal: | OR Spectrum |
| Authors: | Homberger Jrg |
| Keywords: | game theory, allocation: resources |
A new generic negotiation‐based mechanism to coordinate project planning software agents to share resources among projects is described. The mechanism, which takes into account asymmetric information and opportunistic behavior, is concretized for the decentralized resource constrained multi‐project scheduling problem, and evaluated on 80 benchmark instances taken from the literature and 60 newly generated instances. Computational tests show that the proposed mechanism comes close to results obtained by central solution methods. For twelve benchmark instances new best solutions could be computed.