The multi‐core, balancedness and axiomatizations for multi‐choice games

The multi‐core, balancedness and axiomatizations for multi‐choice games

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Article ID: iaor201110532
Volume: 40
Issue: 4
Start Page Number: 677
End Page Number: 689
Publication Date: Nov 2011
Journal: International Journal of Game Theory
Authors: ,
Abstract:

This note extends the solution concept of the core for cooperative games to multi‐choice games. We propose an extension of the theorem of Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967) to multi‐choice games. Also, we introduce a notion of reduced games for multi‐choice games and provide an axiomatization of the core on multi‐choice games by means of corresponding notion of consistency and its converse.

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