Correlated equilibria in two-player repeated games with nonobservable actions

Correlated equilibria in two-player repeated games with nonobservable actions

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Article ID: iaor19921439
Country: United States
Volume: 17
Issue: 1
Start Page Number: 175
End Page Number: 199
Publication Date: Feb 1992
Journal: Mathematics of Operations Research
Authors:
Abstract:

Four kinds of correlated equilibrium payoff sets in undiscounted repeated games with nonobservable actions are studied. Three of them, the upper, the uniform, and Banach lead to the same payoff set, whereas the lower one in general is associated with a larger set. The extensive form correlated equilibrium is also explored. It turns out that both the regular and extensive form correlated equilibria yield the same sets of payoffs.

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