The implications of the ranking axiom for discrete cost sharing methods

The implications of the ranking axiom for discrete cost sharing methods

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Article ID: iaor20118094
Volume: 40
Issue: 3
Start Page Number: 551
End Page Number: 589
Publication Date: Aug 2011
Journal: International Journal of Game Theory
Authors:
Keywords: cost allocation, ranking
Abstract:

In this paper, we study the Ranking property for discrete cost sharing methods. In the two‐agent model, we characterize the set of methods satisfying this axiom: the symmetry of the flow representing the method is necessary and sufficient for Ranking. In higher dimensions (n ≥ 3), we identify strong implications of the axiom; however, we prove that these conditions are not sufficient to characterize Ranking. For the so‐called elementary fixed flows, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition.

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