A Ramsey bound on stable sets in Jordan pillage games

A Ramsey bound on stable sets in Jordan pillage games

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Article ID: iaor20118088
Volume: 40
Issue: 3
Start Page Number: 461
End Page Number: 466
Publication Date: Aug 2011
Journal: International Journal of Game Theory
Authors: ,
Keywords: cooperative games
Abstract:

Jordan (2006) defined ‘pillage games’, a class of cooperative games whose dominance operator is represented by a ‘power function’ satisfying coalitional and resource monotonicity axioms. In this environment, he proved that stable sets must be finite. We provide a graph theoretical interpretation of the problem which tightens the finite bound to a Ramsey number. We also prove that the Jordan pillage axioms are independent.

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