Simultaneous Ad Auctions

Simultaneous Ad Auctions

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Article ID: iaor20113636
Volume: 36
Issue: 1
Start Page Number: 1
End Page Number: 13
Publication Date: Feb 2011
Journal: Mathematics of Operations Research
Authors: , ,
Keywords: auctions
Abstract:

We consider a model with two simultaneous VCG ad auctions A and B where each advertiser chooses to participate in a single ad auction. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium in that model. Moreover, when the click rates in A are pointwise higher than those in B, we prove that the expected revenue in A is greater than the expected revenue in B in this equilibrium. In contrast, we show that this revenue ranking does not hold when advertisers can participate in both auctions.

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