Determining all Nash equilibria in a (bi‐linear) inspection game

Determining all Nash equilibria in a (bi‐linear) inspection game

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Article ID: iaor20118229
Volume: 215
Issue: 2
Start Page Number: 422
End Page Number: 430
Publication Date: Dec 2011
Journal: European Journal of Operational Research
Authors: , ,
Keywords: inspection
Abstract:

This paper addresses a ‘game’ between an inspection agency and multiple inspectees that are subject to random inspections by that agency. We provide explicit (easily computable) expressions for all possible Nash equilibria and verify that none is left out. In particular, our results characterize situations when there exists a unique Nash equilibrium. We also explore special features of the Nash equilibria and the solution of the problem the inspection agency faces in a non‐strategic environment.

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