In the present paper, we introduce a new solution concept for TU‐games, the simplified modified nucleolus or the SM‐nucleolus. It is based on the idea of the modified nucleolus (the modiclus) and takes into account both the constructive power and the blocking power of a coalition. The SM‐nucleolus inherits this convenient property from the modified nucleolus, but it avoids its high computational complexity. We prove that the SM‐nucleolus of an arbitrary n‐person TU‐game coincides with the prenucleolus of a certain n‐person constant‐sum game, which is constructed as the average of the game and its dual. Some properties of the new solution are discussed. We show that the SM‐nucleolus coincides with the Shapley value for three‐person games. However, this does not hold for general n‐person cooperative TU‐games. To confirm this fact, a counter example is presented in the paper. On top of this, we give several examples that illustrate similarities and differences between the SM‐nucleolus and well‐known solution concepts for TU‐games. Finally, the SM‐nucleolus is applied to the weighted voting games.
