Article ID: | iaor20112014 |
Volume: | 40 |
Issue: | 1 |
Start Page Number: | 179 |
End Page Number: | 198 |
Publication Date: | Feb 2011 |
Journal: | International Journal of Game Theory |
Authors: | Gth Werner, Qiu Jianying, Berninghaus Siegfried, Levati Vittoria |
Keywords: | economics |
In a duopoly market, aspiration levels express how much sellers want to earn given their expectations about the other’s behavior. We augment the sellers’ decision task by eliciting their profit aspiration. In a first experimental phase, whenever satisficing is not possible, sales choices, point beliefs, or aspiration levels have to be adapted. This allows us to compare ‘aspiration‐based satisficing’ to ‘aspiration adaptation’. In a second phase, testing the absorption of satisficing, participants are free to select non‐satisficing sales profiles. The results reveal that most participants are satisficers who, in line with aspiration adaptation theory, tend to adjust aspiration levels and to keep sales behavior nearly unchanged.