The subcoalition-perfect core of cooperative games

The subcoalition-perfect core of cooperative games

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Article ID: iaor20108922
Volume: 181
Issue: 1
Start Page Number: 591
End Page Number: 601
Publication Date: Dec 2010
Journal: Annals of Operations Research
Authors: ,
Abstract:

The core is a set-valued solution concept for cooperative games. In situations where the characteristic function is not monotone the classical definition may not be sufficient. Hence, we propose a subset of the core that is called subcoalition-perfect core. It will be proven that the subcoalition-perfect core coincides with the set of non-negative core allocations. Furthermore, an ellipsoid algorithm is provided which may be applied in many applications to compute an element in the subcoalition-perfect core. In addition, we discuss an application where the characteristic function is not monotone and perform a computational study.

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