Article ID: | iaor20108922 |
Volume: | 181 |
Issue: | 1 |
Start Page Number: | 591 |
End Page Number: | 601 |
Publication Date: | Dec 2010 |
Journal: | Annals of Operations Research |
Authors: | Drechsel J, Kimms A |
The core is a set-valued solution concept for cooperative games. In situations where the characteristic function is not monotone the classical definition may not be sufficient. Hence, we propose a subset of the core that is called subcoalition-perfect core. It will be proven that the subcoalition-perfect core coincides with the set of non-negative core allocations. Furthermore, an ellipsoid algorithm is provided which may be applied in many applications to compute an element in the subcoalition-perfect core. In addition, we discuss an application where the characteristic function is not monotone and perform a computational study.