Games with externalities: games in coalition configuration function form

Games with externalities: games in coalition configuration function form

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Article ID: iaor20106039
Volume: 72
Issue: 1
Start Page Number: 171
End Page Number: 186
Publication Date: Aug 2010
Journal: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research
Authors:
Keywords: cooperative games, Shapley value
Abstract:

In this paper we introduce a model of cooperative game with externalities which generalizes games in partition function form by allowing players to take part in more than one coalition. We provide an extension of the Shapley value (1953) to these games, which is a generalization of the Myerson value (1977) for games in partition function form. This value is derived by considering an adaptation of an axiomatic characterization of the Myerson value (1977).

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