Two-agent cooperative search using game models with endurance-time constraints

Two-agent cooperative search using game models with endurance-time constraints

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Article ID: iaor20105506
Volume: 42
Issue: 7
Start Page Number: 617
End Page Number: 639
Publication Date: Jul 2010
Journal: Engineering Optimization
Authors: ,
Keywords: game theory
Abstract:

In this article, the problem of two Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) cooperatively searching an unknown region is addressed. The search region is discretized into hexagonal cells and each cell is assumed to possess an uncertainty value. The UAVs have to cooperatively search these cells taking limited endurance, sensor and communication range constraints into account. Due to limited endurance, the UAVs need to return to the base station for refuelling and also need to select a base station when multiple base stations are present. This article proposes a route planning algorithm that takes endurance time constraints into account and uses game theoretical strategies to reduce the uncertainty. The route planning algorithm selects only those cells that ensure the agent will return to any one of the available bases. A set of paths are formed using these cells which the game theoretical strategies use to select a path that yields maximum uncertainty reduction. We explore non-cooperative Nash, cooperative and security strategies from game theory to enhance the search effectiveness. Monte-Carlo simulations are carried out which show the superiority of the game theoretical strategies over greedy strategy for different look ahead step length paths. Within the game theoretical strategies, non-cooperative Nash and cooperative strategy perform similarly in an ideal case, but Nash strategy performs better than the cooperative strategy when the perceived information is different. We also propose a heuristic based on partitioning of the search space into sectors to reduce computational overhead without performance degradation.

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