Article ID: | iaor20105392 |
Volume: | 69 |
Issue: | 2 |
Start Page Number: | 289 |
End Page Number: | 316 |
Publication Date: | Aug 2010 |
Journal: | Theory and Decision |
Authors: | Diss Mostapha, Merlin Vincent |
Keywords: | voting |
When choosing a voting rule to make subsequent decisions, the members of a committee may wish this rule to be self-selected when it is the object of a choice among a menu of different possible voting rules. Such concepts have recently been explored in Social Choice theory, and a menu of voting rule is said to be stable if it contains at least one self-selective voting rule at each profile of preferences on voting rules. We consider in this article the menu constituted by the three well-known scoring rules {Borda, Plurality, and Antiplurality}. Under the Impartial Culture assumption, which proposes an a priori model to estimate the likelihood of the profiles, we will derive a probability for the stability of this triplet of voting rules.