On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules

On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules

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Article ID: iaor20105392
Volume: 69
Issue: 2
Start Page Number: 289
End Page Number: 316
Publication Date: Aug 2010
Journal: Theory and Decision
Authors: ,
Keywords: voting
Abstract:

When choosing a voting rule to make subsequent decisions, the members of a committee may wish this rule to be self-selected when it is the object of a choice among a menu of different possible voting rules. Such concepts have recently been explored in Social Choice theory, and a menu of voting rule is said to be stable if it contains at least one self-selective voting rule at each profile of preferences on voting rules. We consider in this article the menu constituted by the three well-known scoring rules {Borda, Plurality, and Antiplurality}. Under the Impartial Culture assumption, which proposes an a priori model to estimate the likelihood of the profiles, we will derive a probability for the stability of this triplet of voting rules.

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