Article ID: | iaor20105388 |
Volume: | 69 |
Issue: | 2 |
Start Page Number: | 183 |
End Page Number: | 204 |
Publication Date: | Aug 2010 |
Journal: | Theory and Decision |
Authors: | Bal Sylvain |
Keywords: | prisoners dilemma |
We study the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma in which the players are restricted to choosing strategies which are implementable by a machine with a bound on its complexity. One player has to use a finite automaton while the other player has to use a finite perceptron. Some examples illustrate that the sets of strategies which are induced by these two types of machines are different and not ordered by set inclusion. Repeated game payoffs are evaluated according to the limit of means. The main result establishes that a cooperation at almost all stages of the game is an equilibrium outcome if the complexity of the machines the players may use is limited enough and if the length