Perceptron versus automaton in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma

Perceptron versus automaton in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma

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Article ID: iaor20105388
Volume: 69
Issue: 2
Start Page Number: 183
End Page Number: 204
Publication Date: Aug 2010
Journal: Theory and Decision
Authors:
Keywords: prisoners dilemma
Abstract:

We study the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma in which the players are restricted to choosing strategies which are implementable by a machine with a bound on its complexity. One player has to use a finite automaton while the other player has to use a finite perceptron. Some examples illustrate that the sets of strategies which are induced by these two types of machines are different and not ordered by set inclusion. Repeated game payoffs are evaluated according to the limit of means. The main result establishes that a cooperation at almost all stages of the game is an equilibrium outcome if the complexity of the machines the players may use is limited enough and if the length T of the repeated game is sufficiently large. This result persists when more than T states are allowed in the player's automaton. We further consider a variant of the model in which the two players are restricted to choosing strategies which are implementable by perceptrons and prove that the players can cooperate at most of the stages provided that the complexity of their perceptrons is sufficiently reduced.

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