Exploiting market size in service systems

We study a profit-maximizing firm providing a service to price and delay sensitive customers. We are interested in analyzing the scale economies inherent in such a system. In particular, we study how the firm's pricing and capacity decisions change as the scale, measured by the potential market for the service, increases. These decisions turn out to depend intricately on the form of the delay costs seen by the customers; we characterize these decisions up to the dominant order in the scale for both convex and concave delay costs. We show that when serving customers on a first-come, first-served basis, if the customers' delay costs are strictly convex, the firm can increase its utilization and extract profits beyond what it can do when customers' delay costs are linear. However, with concave delay costs, the firm is forced to decrease its utilization and makes less profit than in the linear case. While studying concave delay costs, we demonstrate that these decisions depend on the scheduling policy employed as well. We show that employing the last-come, first-served rule in the concave case results in utilization and profit similar to the linear case, regardless of the actual form of the delay costs.