Article ID: | iaor20105175 |
Volume: | 31 |
Issue: | 2 |
Start Page Number: | 275 |
End Page Number: | 288 |
Publication Date: | Mar 2010 |
Journal: | Journal of Information & Optimization Sciences |
Authors: | Nakai Teruhisa, Furuyama Shigehito |
Keywords: | prisoners dilemma, Nash equilibrium |
In a non-cooperative game, to explain the variety in strategy selections by players, Nakai presents the concept of subjective game, but its verification is not yet performed. We perform game experiments in various dilemma situations and obtain the result that the rate of coincidence of the action indicated by the subjective Nash equilibrium strategy with the actually selected action is more than 75%, especially, the rate in a prisoner's dilemma game is 91.7%. Since it is known that the rate of coincidence of the Nash equilibrium strategy with the actual action in a prisoner's dilemma game is 53%, the high explanation power of the subjective game has been verified.