The interval Shapley value: an axiomatization

The interval Shapley value: an axiomatization

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Article ID: iaor20104745
Volume: 18
Issue: 2
Start Page Number: 131
End Page Number: 140
Publication Date: Jun 2010
Journal: Central European Journal of Operations Research
Authors: , ,
Keywords: Shapley value
Abstract:

The Shapley value, one of the most widespread concepts in operations Research applications of cooperative game theory, was defined and axiomatically characterized in different game-theoretic models. Recently much research work has been done in order to extend OR models and methods, in particular cooperative game theory, for situations with interval data. This paper focuses on the Shapley value for cooperative games where the set of players is finite and the coalition values are compact intervals of real numbers. The interval Shapley value is characterized with the aid of the properties of additivity, efficiency, symmetry and dummy player, which are straightforward generalizations of the corresponding properties in the classical cooperative game theory.

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