Uncoupled automata and pure Nash equilibria

Uncoupled automata and pure Nash equilibria

0.00 Avg rating0 Votes
Article ID: iaor20104473
Volume: 39
Issue: 3
Start Page Number: 483
End Page Number: 502
Publication Date: Jul 2010
Journal: International Journal of Game Theory
Authors:
Keywords: Nash equilibrium
Abstract:

We study the problem of reaching a pure Nash equilibrium in multi-person games that are repeatedly played, under the assumption of uncoupledness: EVERY player knows only his own payoff function. We consider strategies that can be implemented by finite-state automata, and characterize the minimal number of states needed in order to guarantee that a pure Nash equilibrium is reached in every game where such an equilibrium exists.

Reviews

Required fields are marked *. Your email address will not be published.