A note on the nucleolus for 2-convex TU (transferable utility) games

A note on the nucleolus for 2-convex TU (transferable utility) games

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Article ID: iaor20102058
Volume: 39
Issue: 1
Start Page Number: 185
End Page Number: 189
Publication Date: Mar 2010
Journal: International Journal of Game Theory
Authors: ,
Keywords: transferable utility
Abstract:

For 2-convex n-person cooperative TU games, the nucleolus is determined as some type of constrained equal award rule. Its proof is based on Maschler, Peleg, and Shapley's geometrical characterization for the intersection of the prekernel with the core. Pairwise bargaining ranges within the core are required to be in equilibrium. This system of non-linear equations is solved and its unique solution agrees with the nucleolus.

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