A differential game related to terrorism: Nash and Stackelberg strategies

A differential game related to terrorism: Nash and Stackelberg strategies

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Article ID: iaor20101573
Volume: 144
Issue: 3
Start Page Number: 533
End Page Number: 555
Publication Date: Mar 2010
Journal: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
Authors: , , ,
Abstract:

The question of how best to prosecute the ‘war on terror’ leads to strategic interaction in an intertemporal setting. We consider a nonzero sum differential game between a government and a terrorist organisation. Due to the state-separability of the game we are able to determine Nash and Stackelberg solutions in analytic form. Their comparison as well as the sensitivity analysis deliver interesting insight into the design of efficient measures to combat terror.

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