Article ID: | iaor200973326 |
Volume: | 57 |
Issue: | 6 |
Start Page Number: | 1421 |
End Page Number: | 1437 |
Publication Date: | Nov 2009 |
Journal: | Operations Research |
Authors: | Cominetti Roberto, Correa Jos R, Stier-Moses Nicols E |
Keywords: | game theory |
In the traffic assignment problem, first proposed by Wardrop in 1952, commuters select the shortest available path to travel from their origins to their destinations. We study a generalization of this problem in which competitors, who may control a nonnegligible fraction of the total flow, ship goods across a network. This type of games, usually referred to as atomic games, readily applies to situations in which the competing freight companies have market power. Other applications include intelligent transportation systems, competition among telecommunication network service providers, and scheduling with flexible machines.