Peculiarities of equilibria in the forbidden-situation games

Peculiarities of equilibria in the forbidden-situation games

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Article ID: iaor200971135
Country: Russia
Volume: 70
Issue: 7
Start Page Number: 1206
End Page Number: 1216
Publication Date: Jul 2009
Journal: Automation and Remote Control
Authors:
Abstract:

Continued was a previous study of the peculiarities of the forbidden-situation games that analyzed the guaranteed results for various sequences of the participants' actions. Consideration now was given to the deformations of the Nash and Pareto equilibria by the mutual actions of the game participants on the set of permissible controls. The general constructions are illustrated by the analytical solutions for the Cournot model of competitive interaction of two manufacturing companies complemented by a constraint on the total raw-material resource.

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