Article ID: | iaor20097249 |
Country: | United States |
Volume: | 37 |
Issue: | 4 |
Start Page Number: | 581 |
End Page Number: | 596 |
Publication Date: | Dec 2008 |
Journal: | International Journal of Game Theory |
Authors: | Neyman Abraham |
Keywords: | markov processes |
The existence of a value and optimal strategies is proved for the class of two–person repeated games where the state follows a Markov chain independently of players' actions and at the beginning of each stage only Player 1 is informed about the state. The results apply to the case of standard signaling where players' stage actions are observable, as well as to the model with general signals provided that Player 1 has a nonrevealing repeated game strategy. The proofs reduce the analysis of these repeated games to that of classical repeated games with incomplete information on one side.