Existence of optimal strategies in Markov games with incomplete information

Existence of optimal strategies in Markov games with incomplete information

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Article ID: iaor20097249
Country: United States
Volume: 37
Issue: 4
Start Page Number: 581
End Page Number: 596
Publication Date: Dec 2008
Journal: International Journal of Game Theory
Authors:
Keywords: markov processes
Abstract:

The existence of a value and optimal strategies is proved for the class of two–person repeated games where the state follows a Markov chain independently of players' actions and at the beginning of each stage only Player 1 is informed about the state. The results apply to the case of standard signaling where players' stage actions are observable, as well as to the model with general signals provided that Player 1 has a nonrevealing repeated game strategy. The proofs reduce the analysis of these repeated games to that of classical repeated games with incomplete information on one side.

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